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Managing New Zealand’s natural heritage
New Zealand is world-renowned for its nature – its lush 
forests, spectacular mountain landscapes, wild and scenic 
rivers, beautiful coastlines and extraordinary biodiversity.  
This natural heritage is the foundation of New Zealand’s 
identity and its branding, and the premier attraction for the 
tourism industry. It provides habitable environments, 
contributes to economic production and assimilates wastes, 
and is an important source of great enjoyment, health and 
well-being (Roberts et al., 2015). Nature contributes to the 
success of the nation’s fishing, farming, forestry and tourism 
industries, which provide about 52% of national export 
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income (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 
2013). But these values and 
the well-being and prosperity 
they enable are being 
diminished and degraded  
at an alarming rate. 
Anthropogenic climate 
change, degradation of  
the marine environment,  
land use change and 
biodiversity loss, impacts of 
invasive species, deteriorating 
quality and diminishing 
availability of fresh water, soil
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contamination and pathogens degrade 
both nature and human well-being. 
Ultimately they threaten life as well as 
livelihoods.
These issues are neither new nor 
confined to New Zealand. Indeed, they 
are a focus of considerable public and 
government attention internationally. 
In response, New Zealand has around 
22 legislative acts that protect nature 
in some way (Schneider and Samkin, 
2012; Brown, Stephens et al., 2015). 
A government agency dedicated to 
nature conservation, the Department 
of Conservation, has been created and 
other central government agencies, such 
as the Ministry for Primary Industries, 
the Ministry for the Environment and 
the Environmental Protection Authority, 
as well as local and regional government 
also have important nature protection 
roles. 
The New Zealand government has 
signed six international conventions 
with commitments to protect nature, 
and prepared a national biodiversity 
strategy (Brown, Stephens et al., 2015). 
Legally protected areas now cover about 
one third of the country, making New 
Zealand one of 24 countries to have 
more than 20% of its land area legally 
protected (Seabrook-Davison, 2014). 
Fifteen water conservation orders 
recognise outstanding values of freshwater 
ecosystems (Water Conservation Order, 
2016), and six wetlands are recognised 
under the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance (Ramsar, 2016). 
A growing network of marine protected 
areas will soon include the Kermadec 
Ocean Sanctuary, the world’s largest no-
take marine reserve, covering 620,000 
square kilometres or about 15% of the 
exclusive economic zone (New Zealand 
Government, 2015).
Additional conservation successes 
are being achieved through community 
and business partnerships with the 
Department of Conservation, local and 
regional government and the Queen 
Elizabeth II (QEII) National Trust (which 
helps private landowners in New Zealand 
protect special natural and cultural 
features on their land with open space 
covenants). There are now over 4,000 
QEII private land covenants (covering 
approximately 200,000 hectares or about 
0.7% of the New Zealand mainland 
and inshore islands) and more than 
600 community conservation initiatives 
under way (Peters, Hamilton and Eames, 
2015). The growth and increasing 
professionalism of voluntary community 
conservation indicates the increasing 
public demand and willingness to 
participate actively in conservation. 
And yet, despite the level of public 
support for conservation and the efforts of 
legislators, communities and conservation 
agencies, the rate of decline is greater and 
the state of nature in New Zealand more 
threatened now than at any time over the 
last 65 million years (Bradshaw, Xingli 
and Sodhi, 2010; Ceballos et al., 2015). 
The state of nature in New Zealand
The sixth great extinction is under way 
(Ceballos et al., 2015), and New Zealand 
leads the world, with more native species 
already extinct (40 species extinct, and 
around 70 not seen for more than 20 
years) or at risk of extinction than any 
other country (Bradshaw, Xingli and 
Sodhi, 2010). Six of ten taxonomic groups 
assessed have half or more of their living 
members classified as threatened or at risk 
of extinction (see Table 1).
In legally protected terrestrial areas 
(around 30% of terrestrial New Zealand), 
endemic vertebrates (bats, birds, lizards 
and freshwater fish) and large invertebrates 
such as land snails are facing extinction 
from invasive mammal predators (Innes 
et al., 2010) and introduced fish species. 
Extinction risk has increased between 
2005 and 2011 for 7% of species assessed 
and declined for 1.5% (Ministry for the 
Environment and Statistics New Zealand, 
2015). On private land (the other 65% 
of terrestrial New Zealand), habitat 
destruction is a further cause of loss 
(Cieraad et al., 2015), often accelerating 
underlying declines caused by introduced 
mammals. Most native freshwater 
fish species are threatened by water 
abstraction, migration barriers and/or 
deteriorating water quality (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 
2013, 2015a), as well as by introduced 
predators such as trout, mosquitofish, 
catfish and perch. Anthropogenic climate 
change is expected to exacerbate many 
of the threats described above (McGlone 
and Walker, 2011).
Large areas of New Zealand are subject 
to invasive mammal control. Some 37% 
of the 6.4 million hectares of remaining 
native forest have recently received some 
form of predator management (Table 
2). About 16% of this was aerial 10801 
control of possums by OSPRI2 to manage 
bovine tuberculosis, 9% was aerial 
1080 operations by the Department of 
Conservation aimed at rat and stoat 
irruptions during the 2014/15 summer, 
and another 7% was covered for other 
purposes between 2010 and 2015. 
However, the continuing decline of 
Table 1:  Percentages of taxonomic groups 
threatened or at risk of extinction 
Taxonomic group
Percentage 
threatened or at risk 
of extinction*
Vascular plants 39
Marine mammals 27
Bats 75
Birds 81
Reptiles 88
Frogs 100
Freshwater fish 72
Freshwater invertebrates 26
Earthworms 19
Marine invertebrates 76
*  Data are percentages of species assessed within each 
taxonomic group. The number of species assessed in the 
large invertebrate groups may be insufficient to represent the 
entire group. 
Source: based on data from Ministry for the Environment and 
Statistics New Zealand, 2015
Table 2: Native forest predator management 
(~6.4 million hectares) 
Management type Percentage of area
Aerial 1080 – DOC 
Battle for our Birds* 9
Aerial 1080 – DOC 
other predator 
control 7
Traps and hand-laid 
toxins 5
Aerial 1080 – AHB 
possum control 16
No management of 
predators 63
* The Battle for our Birds project was undertaken in the summer 
of 2014/15. All other management is from 2010 until June 
2015.
Source: Walker, Monks and Innes, 2015 
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endemic forest vertebrates shows that 
the intensity of these efforts and the area 
covered are still insufficient to halt the 
decline of forest species threatened by 
mammal predators (Walker, Monks and 
Innes, 2015).
There is little management of habitat 
loss and degradation for biodiversity 
compared to predator management. 
Efforts to monitor habitat loss to date 
have tended to be uncoordinated and 
irregular, so there is no definitive source 
for the rate of habitat loss. This should 
change with the recent introduction of 
the Environmental Reporting Act. From 
various sources, however, it is possible 
to obtain a picture of recent habitat loss. 
Environment Aotearoa 2015 identified a 
loss of around 10,000 hectares (0.26%) 
of indigenous forest since 1996 (Ministry 
for the Environment and Statistics 
New Zealand, 2015). However, there 
is a considerably greater portion of 
non-forest habitat (wetland, grassland, 
herbfield, shrubland) that has been lost 
to agricultural intensification (Cieraad et 
al., 2015). Approximately 70,000 hectares 
of indigenous grassland in the central 
South Island alone was converted to 
intensive agriculture and forestry between 
1990 and 2008 (Weeks et al., 2013), with 
conversion continuing since.
Why is nature so hard to protect? 
The question must be asked: why, despite 
substantial public and private efforts 
to conserve nature in New Zealand, is 
New Zealand’s natural heritage still 
declining? 
Brown, Stephens et al. (2015) 
propose that nature protection in general 
fails to halt decline and loss because 
current efforts address proximal rather 
than fundamental causes of loss. The 
fundamental cause is the misalignment 
of government, business, private and 
public interests in nature’s protection. 
For government at all levels, protecting 
nature is a controversial demand on an 
already stretched public purse, often 
resulting in the underfunding of private 
conservation. Private landowners and 
businesses often find the opportunity 
and management costs of retaining/
managing nature outweigh the immediate 
benefits of its loss, and don’t consider 
the cumulative negative impacts of 
their individual actions on nature. The 
public, on the other hand, enjoys both 
the benefits supplied by nature and some 
economic benefits arising from its loss to 
development. 
These divergent interests motivate 
a range of behaviours and conflict. 
Outcomes for nature are shaped by the 
distribution of power among stakeholders 
and mediated through phenomena 
such as the collective action problem 
(Olsen, 1965), agency capture (Clare 
and Krogman, 2013) and bureaucratic 
slippage (Freudenburg and Gramling, 
1994). This can result in the regulated 
community controlling regulatory 
decisions and/or performances in a way 
that serves the interests of the regulated 
community rather than the interests of 
the public (Clare and Krogman, 2013).
We argue that effectively halting 
nature’s loss must involve an approach 
that aligns these interests and incentivises 
behaviours that promote nature’s 
conservation.
A common institution for bringing 
divergent interests toward alignment is 
markets. However, markets typically fail 
nature because many of nature’s uses 
and characteristics are non-exclusive 
(that is, it is not possible to obtain full 
payment for the benefits provided by 
nature, or the full cost of using nature’s 
benefits can be avoided) and/or non-
rival (that is, the use of nature by one 
individual doesn’t affect the use of nature 
by others) (Randall, 1983). In other 
words, the public-good (Godden, 2006) 
nature of nature (whether it is on public 
or privately managed land) means these 
markets have not been established and 
are missing (Randall, 1983).
One policy response is to use 
regulation. New Zealand has pursued 
environmental regulation primarily 
through the Resource Management, 
Conservation and Wildlife acts. The 
development of rules and regulations 
(for example, regional policy statements, 
regional and district plans, conservation 
plans) in New Zealand is typically highly 
litigious, involving long public submission 
and appeal processes. 
The cumbersome and often 
adversarial nature of these processes 
creates a self-selection mechanism for 
participation, with participation being 
more attractive to those with adequate 
resources to participate (that is, mostly 
well-organised groups and organisations) 
and outcomes favouring those who 
participate (Freudenburg and Gramling, 
1994). Given that the private-interest 
benefits of degrading nature are often 
higher and less diffuse than the perceived 
public benefits of preserving nature, 
there is: (1) little incentive for members 
of the public to engage in plan and 
rule development processes, and (2) a 
temptation for the public to free-ride by 
relying on the efforts of others to protect 
one’s own interest in nature’s protection. 
Policy misalignment or lack of policy 
integration sends conflicting policy signals, 
further weakening the existing incentives 
to preserve nature (Pearce and Turner, 
1990). Many of these conflicting policy 
signals enhance the cost-competitiveness 
of New Zealand businesses. Part of this 
cost-competitiveness comes from hidden 
subsidies (such as no charge on nature 
and environmental services consumed) 
and minimal enforcement of resource 
consent conditions (Brown, Clarkson et 
al., 2013) and animal welfare, employment 
and health and safety standards. There 
are also direct financial subsidies, such 
as the Irrigation Acceleration Fund, 
which lowers the cost of production in 
New Zealand’s regulatory and public-
funding approaches to managing nature 
are presently ... isolated from economic 
policy ...
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the primary sector, or the low valuations 
of public land transferred to private 
ownership during the high country 
tenure review process (Brower, 2016). 
Policies to conserve nature which increase 
the financial cost of production without 
concomitant incentives for conservation 
are likely to create opposition to 
reform, particularly if this reduces the 
international cost-competitiveness of 
New Zealand businesses.
New Zealand’s regulatory and 
public-funding approaches to managing 
nature are presently also isolated 
from economic policy, and a lack of 
coordination and integration leads 
to conflict between economic goals 
and environmental protection. Often 
environmental protection is perceived as 
creating unwelcome costs and limits on 
production, as encapsulated in the phrase 
used in the release of a draft regional 
mining strategy: ‘red carpet not red tape’ 
(West Coast Regional Council, 2015). 
The institutional arrangements to 
support policy integration are also largely 
absent in New Zealand. The Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment is 
arguably the only institution to have a 
mandate to scrutinise the environmental 
implications of sectoral policy-making. 
While the commissioner provides 
independent advice and may encourage 
preventive measures and remedial actions 
to protect the environment, the decisions 
to change law, policy and institutional 
arrangements are the responsibility of 
Parliament and government agencies. The 
degree to which these institutions respond 
to the commissioner’s recommendations 
are variable, especially where politicians 
and decision-makers may have incentives 
to seek immediate benefits, avoid 
controversial reforms and allow costs to 
fall on future generations. 
Formulating an alternative policy response
Where private interests degrade nature, 
it is frequently because perceived 
benefits exceed the perceived costs of 
both degradation and the alternative, 
maintaining nature. Thus, private interests 
require incentives for conservation 
sufficient to match the incentive to 
degrade nature if their interests are to be 
preserved.
Policy integration is a key aspect 
to consider when formulating a 
policy response to strengthen and 
align policy signals, as well as help 
achieve intergenerational equity, which 
governments arguably should be 
considering on behalf of their population. 
Policy integration aims, at a minimum, 
to take environmental considerations 
into account. Ideally, it would place 
environmental considerations at the heart 
of decision-making in other sectoral 
policies (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). 
There are many interventions available 
to help preserve New Zealand’s natural 
heritage. Among them are more effective 
regulation, collaborative governance, 
regional landscape planning that 
accounts for natural capital, enhanced 
agency accountability for environmental 
outcomes, expanded tools for private 
land protection, more public funding for 
conservation, and strengthened public 
interest litigation (Brown, Stephens et 
al., 2015). However, while some aspects 
of these have been adopted by agencies 
and landowners both internationally and 
in New Zealand, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the improvements achieved 
are sufficient to halt ongoing loss. Brown, 
Stephens et al. (2015) argue that this is 
because they do not adequately address 
the interests and incentives underlying 
behaviours that cause nature’s loss. For 
example, none of these interventions 
address incentives underlying the 
tendency to allow the cost of immediate 
benefits to fall on future generations, 
or provide incentives for government 
to resist pressures from special interest 
groups (Pearce and Turner, 1990). A 
policy response, however, that begins 
to integrate fiscal and environmental 
policy and that arguably could provide a 
stronger incentive to conserve nature in 
New Zealand is tax reform.
An OECD study of taxation, 
innovation and the environment (OECD, 
2010) argues that environmental taxes 
can be a basis for policy integration that 
aligns public and private interests while 
encouraging private and public sector 
innovation. The report contends that 
environmental taxes should be central to 
a country’s environmental policy because 
they incentivise pertinent innovation 
for harm reduction and its adoption at 
least cost. Environmental taxes, it argues, 
complement and support regulation 
to better internalise environmental 
externalities through innovations and 
behaviours that would be neither 
devised nor adopted without such taxes. 
Furthermore, the tax should be levied 
as directly as possible on the pollutant 
or action causing the environmental 
damage, as this stimulates abatement 
incentives for all possible abatement 
options (OECD, 2010, p.139). 
While tax reform discussions have 
begun in New Zealand, they are still 
in their infancy (Tax Working Group, 
2010; Salmond, 2011) and have not yet 
included consideration of the role of 
corrective taxes such as those proposed 
by the OECD. Some of the Tax Working 
Group’s key conclusions were that:
•	 New	Zealand	relies	heavily	on	the	
taxes most harmful to growth, 
particularly corporate and personal 
taxes on capital income;
•	 the	tax	system	lacks	coherence,	
integrity and fairness, with the tax 
burden disproportionately borne by 
wage earners, since many with wealth 
can restructure their affairs through 
The intent of [an enviromental] tax 
would be to integrate economic and 
environmental management decisions 
by internalising environmental costs and 
incentivising conservation.
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trusts and companies to shelter 
income from taxes;
•	 there	will	be	increasing	demands	
on the revenue base arising from 
demographic change, the rising cost 
of financing higher public debt, 
and, we would add, climate change 
mitigation costs. (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 
2015b)
A land use tax, while being more of 
a corrective tax, could potentially address 
these issues raised by the Tax Working 
Group.
Conceptual basis for an environmental tax: 
the land use tax
Taxes based on the capital value of land 
and any improvements (e.g. buildings 
etc.) already exist in New Zealand. Local 
authorities levy rates on this basis, and 
many offer rates relief for covenanted 
natural areas (similar to property tax relief 
in Canada (Ontario, 2016)). The merits of 
a national land tax levied on capital value 
(Coleman and Grimes, 2009) and on an 
area basis (Brandt, 2014) have also been 
discussed for New Zealand. Their major 
environmental drawback is that they 
create disincentives for conservation that 
need to be countered with exemptions for 
natural areas. 
Most of New Zealand’s pressing 
environmental problems (water pollution, 
biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas 
emissions) arise partly or primarily 
from the intensification of land use. 
Therefore, an environmental tax based 
on the intensity of land use is likely to 
be an appropriate and effective approach 
to retaining and maintaining nature’s 
capital stocks and subsequent flow of 
benefits. Such a tax, following the OECD 
principles, would be internationally 
novel, although its potential was explored 
during property tax reform discussions 
in Germany (Bizer and Lang, 2000, cited 
in Brandt, 2014). The intent of this tax 
would be to integrate economic and 
environmental management decisions 
by internalising environmental costs and 
incentivising conservation.
The basis of a land use tax could follow 
the Accident Compensation Corporation 
(ACC) model. ACC views workforce 
health and safety as a form of public 
wealth (analogous to environmental 
goods and services) that is diminished 
and degraded by injury (analogous to 
environmentally harmful land use). It 
classifies business activities according to 
the likelihood of accident (not the actual 
harm caused) and applies a variable 
per-dollar earner levy reflecting the risk 
associated with each activity class. There 
is also a mechanism for rewarding good 
safety performance. Rates are periodically 
reviewed to account for inflation and 
other factors that change over time. 
We suggest that this conceptual 
framework could be usefully applied to 
nature by taxing private benefit on the 
basis of likelihood of environmental 
impact (as with ACC). In this way, 
environmental degradation could be 
estimated from land characteristics and 
its management, rather than having 
to measure actual environmental 
degradation.
Design of a land use tax for New Zealand
While there are many possible technical 
formulations for a land use tax, we outline 
a two-tier approach, in an attempt to 
reduce the administrative burden of 
such a tax but also provide an incentive 
to undertake greater nature conservation 
actions. The outline provided only 
sketches out how such a tax might work. 
Additional design and assessment is 
required to refine the details of the tax, 
as well as to more broadly familiarise and 
engage the general public, government, 
industry and business with the concept.
This two-tier approach uses categories 
of land use as surrogates for the level 
of environmental impact of associated 
activities. The first tier provides the core 
framework for the approach and could 
function as a stand-alone system, while 
the second tier provides the sophistication 
and differentiation required to 
incentivise well-integrated production 
and environmental outcomes. This two-
tier approach is similar to that used for 
forestry in the New Zealand Emissions 
Trading Scheme, where Ministry for 
Primary Industries tables can be used 
to estimate carbon sequestration (based 
on species, region and age class), or 
carbon sequestration can be estimated 
using more precise methods based on 
basal diameters of trees (as laid out in 
the Climate Change (Forestry Sector) 
Regulations 2008).
Tier one: the core framework
The most environmentally harmful land 
uses would attract high per-hectare tax 
rates, with lower rates for more benign 
uses and rebates for areas remaining in 
native vegetation or legally protected for 
conservation. In this way, tax rates could 
be scaled to the level of environmental 
externality being generated: as an example, 
taxes on open space would be lower than 
on land that is no longer permeable 
because of paving and buildings, and an 
intensive use (such as irrigated dairying) 
would be taxed more per hectare than 
extensive pastoralism. Different parts of 
a single property may fall into different 
land use categories and so be subject to 
different per-hectare tax rates, depending 
on property size and the spatial resolution 
of land categories. Land characteristics and 
its use could be estimated and regularly 
updated from satellite imagery and 
existing databases such as Landonline (for 
The most environmentally harmful land 
uses would attract high per-hectare tax 
rates, with lower rates for more benign 
uses and rebates for areas remaining in 
native vegetation or legally protected for 
conservation.
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land title data), the land cover database 
and protected areas database (for land 
use information), and S-Map (for soil 
characteristics). 
Tier one is essentially a flat tax 
(i.e. a uniform fixed rate for each land 
category) which would be relatively 
simple, with administrative costs falling 
almost exclusively on the administering 
agency and few, if any, additional 
transaction costs for landowners. 
However, it is a blunt instrument in that 
it assumes all land within a category has 
similar characteristics and is used in the 
same way, resulting in the same level 
of environmental degradation. A land 
manager can only affect tax liability by 
changing land management in ways that 
alter the area of different land categories 
within their property.
Tier two: incentives for better environmental 
management
Landowners and managers would have 
more opportunity to affect tax liability 
(and incentive to integrate production and 
environmental outcomes) if land within 
each category were further differentiated 
according to its capability and actual use. 
Lower rates could be associated with uses 
which match the capability of the land, 
while higher rates are applied to areas where 
land use exceeds capability. For example, 
a landowner could intensify land use on 
flatter land with more stable soils that have 
lower nutrient-leaching potential, and 
restore or protect more environmentally 
sensitive areas of land such as riparian 
margins. Landowners could then further 
reduce their tax liability by demonstrating 
that their management practices (within 
an area of land of a particular category) 
have a lower environmental impact or 
improve the condition of land and its 
subsequent flow of benefits to a standard 
that exceeds those specified for the tax rate 
threshold(s) within that land category. 
The level of tax deduction could be 
determined using individual land use and 
management information such as stocking 
rates, nutrient inputs, types of mitigation 
practices and sustainability systems (e.g. 
green roofing) being used, or level of legal 
protection for natural areas.
The information and design require-
ments for this second tier would be 
greater than the tier-one administrative 
costs for both government and 
landowners. Landowners would bear the 
cost of evidence required to demonstrate 
that threshold standards had been met, 
and government would have greater 
review and verification costs. The benefit 
gained, however, would be better-
integrated environmental and production 
outcomes through expanded opportunity 
for landowners to manage their tax 
liability.
Land-use category tax rates
Given the OECD recommendation 
(OECD, 2010, p.139) that the tax rate 
should reflect society’s value of the 
harm done (which likely includes 
non-environmental harms) as well as 
government’s need to raise revenues, 
the proposed tax rate would be higher 
than simply the estimated value of 
environmental damage to society. This is 
to better account for the damage to and 
overuse of the environment by individuals 
or businesses.
Tax rates are important as they will 
be what drive the extent of behaviour 
change by landowners and therefore the 
level of additional nature conservation 
that is undertaken. These rates would be 
routinely updated to match inflation and 
reflect changes over time in the relative 
value of different types of environmental 
harm.
The number of land use categories 
and the per-hectare tax rate associated 
with each are matters that require more 
detailed research and scenario modelling. 
This is to understand the implications of 
different tax rates at the property scale 
as well as in aggregate for the various 
land-based sectors, and what, if any, 
unintended consequences may result. 
Tax administration
The administration of a land use tax 
would likely require new or enhanced 
systems within Inland Revenue (IRD) to 
store, process and analyse large spatial 
databases, potentially including satellite 
spectral imagery. This may require new 
capability within IRD. Alternatively, cross-
agency partnerships could be created, 
where agencies such as Land Information 
New Zealand could provide the required 
information to IRD.
Some of the data required to 
implement a tier-one system are already 
available. For instance, a variety of public 
domain satellite imagery can be used to 
define land use intensity categories. Land 
boundaries and ownership are already 
defined in cadastral land title databases 
(and used by regional governments to 
administer the rating system). The data 
required for tier two would depend on the 
eligibility criteria for tax rate reductions. 
Evidence used to demonstrate compliance 
with existing resource consents and 
covenant conditions might help serve this 
purpose.
Anticipated benefits of a land use tax
The ability of a land use tax to arrest 
the continued degradation of nature 
in New Zealand lies in its potential to 
align the interests of land-based primary 
industries, government and wage earners 
with conservation and environmental 
protection. 
Growth benefits
The additional revenue raised through a 
land use tax could allow a reduction in 
corporate and income tax rates, which 
may help facilitate economic growth 
(Barker, Buckle and St Clair, 2008). It 
would also present an opportunity to 
If the tax rates fully reflect the value to 
society of all externalities related to land 
use, then the revenue levied should be of 
sufficient scale to deliver a combination of 
otherwise-elusive social benefits.
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align personal, company and trust taxes 
to improve the integrity and fairness of 
the tax system and reduce tax avoidance. 
If revenue levied by a land use tax exceeds 
reductions from other taxes, the surplus 
could be recycled to:
•	 support	community/public	
conservation efforts;
•	 assist	low-income	or	disadvantaged	
landowners reduce their negative 
impacts on nature;
•	 fund	future	commitments,	such	
as those related to climate change 
mitigation actions;
•	 fund	the	level	of	pest	control	
required on public conservation 
land to ensure the persistence of our 
threatened endemic fauna and flora.
Societal benefits
Tax signals affect business growth 
decisions, wider investment decisions 
and strategic development decisions. 
Fundamentally changing that signal to 
incorporate the positive and negative 
impacts that decisions have on nature will 
provide impetus for landowners to manage 
land differently. Rational landowners will 
reduce their tax burden through actions 
that maximise their total tax deductions 
or rebates. 
Over time, benefits above and 
beyond the direct financial benefits of 
a reduced tax burden from enhancing 
nature will begin to accrue. New 
Zealanders are likely to see the benefits 
of more sustainable production systems, 
improved well-being, growth in 
industries reliant on healthy ecosystems, 
and expanded business opportunities 
from the diversification options available 
by preserving nature. We should also 
see the creation of safe refuges for flora 
and fauna currently being lost through 
habitat degradation.
If the tax rates fully reflect the value 
to society of all externalities related 
to land use, then the revenue levied 
should be of sufficient scale to deliver a 
combination of otherwise-elusive social 
benefits. While the corrective goal of the 
tax is to maintain the benefits flowing 
from nature, the tax has potentially 
broader benefits through any reduction 
in the wealth gap (Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2009). The wealth gap in New Zealand is 
large relative to other OECD countries 
(ninth largest out of 34 countries). 
Compared to Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom, low-income earners 
face a higher overall tax burden in New 
Zealand, while high-income earners face 
a lower tax burden than they would face 
in those three countries (Salmond, 2011). 
The inherently progressive character of a 
land use tax could change this balance. 
The area of land owned and the intensity 
of its use are arguably highly correlated 
with wealth and therefore ability to pay. 
Most low-income earners own little, if 
any, land and would be exposed only 
through what may be passed on in rents. 
An additional benefit is the potential for 
additional tax revenue to reduce the tax 
rates for lower-income earners.
Private sector benefits 
The greatest financial benefit will accrue to 
landowners with the lowest environmental 
impacts. Reductions in environmental 
impact could be achieved by confining 
intensive uses to small areas, retaining 
areas in predominantly natural cover, or 
implementing management practices that 
lower negative environmental impacts. For 
instance, Mäori landowners or custodians 
who own/manage land in native vegetation 
and derive income from low-impact land-
based tourism will benefit from having a 
lower land tax rate, as well as receiving a 
tax deduction/rebate for any additional 
actions to improve the state of nature on 
their land. 
Those businesses managing their 
operations with a clear focus on 
sustainable management practices 
may find additional benefit in the 
substance and authenticity added to 
their brands related to the conservation 
of nature. Businesses in sectors such 
as tourism, information technology, 
communications, service, manufacturing, 
health and education would likely enjoy 
improved competitiveness associated 
with both reduced tax liability and 
greater authenticity of environmental 
sustainability branding. Many businesses 
may enjoy a boost from broad-based 
economic growth promoted by the shift 
towards taxing the private consumption 
of public wealth rather than taxing the 
production of private wealth. Businesses 
in the primary sector that currently receive 
hidden subsidies will be incentivised to 
change the way they operate to lower 
their negative environmental impacts or 
face larger costs to continue business as 
usual. 
Concluding reflections
Environmental degradation and 
biodiversity loss continue because there 
is insufficient incentive for businesses and 
households to not harm the environment, 
and for government resources (including 
financial, political and capacity) to fully 
utilise the currently available tools for 
nature conservation. The complexity of 
environmental issues combined with 
the collective action problem mean that 
those who are affected by environmental 
degradation are not compensated by 
those causing the degradation. This 
resulting ‘wicked problem’ leaves most 
environmental problems unresolved and 
demanding government intervention. A 
corrective environmental tax like a land 
use tax could provide a way through at 
least some of these challenges.
Perhaps the most significant remaining 
challenge not addressed specifically by a 
land use tax relates to the political 
economy. Governments are often guided 
by immediate political priorities which 
lead governments to incur debt now, 
The political incentives to accumulate 
environmental debt rather than 
implement controversial reform 
mean that effective steps to curtail 
environmental degradation are unlikely.
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thereby shifting costs onto future 
generations. Debt can be in any form: 
built, financial, social and natural capital. 
Changing the status quo of policy – 
whether it is tax reform, environmental 
regulation or some other policy reform – 
can affect the election aspirations of 
government. Thus, governments have an 
incentive to avoid reform, especially 
controversial and potentially costly 
reform, and instead allow debt to 
accumulate for future generations. 
Applying this to nature highlights how 
the misalignment of political and public 
interests is likely resulting in a socially 
suboptimal accumulation of environ-
mental debt. 
The political incentives to 
accumulate environmental debt rather 
than implement controversial reform 
mean that effective steps to curtail 
environmental degradation are unlikely. 
However, New Zealand has demonstrated 
its ability to address equally challenging 
problems when it implemented new 
fiscal policy and incorporated fiscal 
responsibility requirements in the Public 
Finance Act 1989. This was to promote 
fiscal sustainability and limit the level 
of debt passed on to future generations. 
Similarly, changes to the Reserve Bank 
Act 1989 enabled interest rates to be set 
independently by the bank’s governor. 
Perhaps the impacts and mitigation costs 
of climate change will lead to something 
akin to the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
to promote environmental sustainability, 
and to the Reserve Bank Act for politically 
independent setting of tax rates on land 
use intensity categories.
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